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1. INTRODUCTION
Individuals often base their decisions on what they observe in their 
neighborhood or peer groups. It can be, on the one hand, that individuals gather 
information from their peers’ experiences: for example, a consumer will be 
more likely to adopt a given product if many of that consumer’s friends report 
a positive experience with the product. On the other hand, it can also be that 
the advantages or benefits attached to an individual’s decision directly depend 
on the decision of others in the individual’s social network. For example, if we 
consider whether or not to acquire a mobile phone or subscribe to an online 
social network, our decision will ultimately depend on how many of our friends 
and peers have bought a phone or subscribed to the online social network.
Social networks are thus central to our decisions, and information on social 
networks has high value to firms wishing to foster the adoption of their product 
and maximize profit. In light of these observations, it is natural to ask what the 
effect of information on social networks is on firms’ competitive behavior and 
strategy(1). In this short note, we seek to address this broad question. We first 
explore two main mechanisms through which social networks affect decision-
-making: information sharing and network externalities. We then discuss how 
information on social networks and these mechanisms impacts two of the key 
decisions made by firms in strategic settings: advertisement and pricing. We 
focus our discussion on recent work in this area and suggest future research 
questions.
2. SOCIAL NETWORKS, INFORMATION SHARING,  
 AND CONFORMITY
In forming decisions, individuals make use of their own experience, but 
also rely on the experiences and decisions of others, e.g. experts and peers. 
This reliance has two important economic roots: information sharing and 
conformity pressures.
2.1. Information sharing
A key facet of most economic decisions is uncertainty. When buying a 
good, making investment decisions, adopting a new technology or choosing 
a career path, agents often only have partial information about the different 
THINKBOX 
March 7, 2016
Prepared for Revista de 
Adminstração [RAUSP]
doi: 10.5700/rausp1237
Sanjeev Goyal, University of Cambridge 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom).
E-mail: sg472@cam.ac.uk
Address: 
University of Cambridge, Faculity of Economic 
Sidgewick Avenue, United Kingdom 
Cambridge CB3 9DD
Julien Gagnon, University of Cambridge  
(Cambridge, United Kingdom).
E-mail: julien.gagnon.5@gmail.comThis is an open access article under the CC BY license.
R.Adm., São Paulo, v.51, n.2, p.240-243, abr./maio/jun. 2016 241
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE FIRM 
dimensions of their decision. A straightforward way to manage 
that uncertainty is to learn from others.
In their seminal work on social communications, Elihu 
Katz and Paul Lazersfeld (1955) found that a key feature 
of information sharing was that a very small fraction of the 
population, called “opinion leaders”, often serves as the 
primary source of information for the rest. More recent work 
has confirmed that this “law of the few” is a robust feature of 
communication on social networks(2).
The presence of opinion leaders has important consequences 
for many economic phenomena. To see why, consider the 
following simple example. Suppose that individuals in a 
community can choose between an old, well-understood 
technology and a new but ill-understood one. Suppose also that 
the new technology is superior to the old one. As with many 
new technologies, repeated trials of the new technology may 
however be needed to ascertain its true quality – the adoption 
of the new technology thus ultimately depends on individuals’ 
sustained belief in its quality. Their belief depends not only 
on their personal experience, but also on what they observe 
or hear – in other words, it will also depend on their personal 
network of communication.
Consider now a community with opinion leaders. With 
positive probability, opinion leaders might all simultaneously 
be “unlucky” with the new technology and have a “bad trial”. 
Because everybody observes them (and because opinion leaders 
observe each other), their bad experience may translate into the 
whole community abandoning the new technology despite its 
superior quality. Conversely, consider a society without such 
opinion leaders. Since the new technology is superior, it will on 
average outperform the old technology and will create strings 
of individuals with “good trials”. Such strings insulate agents 
within those strings from premature information about possible 
bad experiences from others and insure that, in the long run, 
the better technology is adopted by all(3).
The presence of “opinion leaders” thus have important 
implications for firms’ strategies, e.g. with respect to 
advertisement and seeding. Sponsored tweets are but one 
example of the ways firms can harness the power of social 
networks to diffuse information about their products.
 2.2. Conformity pressures
In addition to information exchange, social interactions also 
give rise to conformity pressures or network effects. Network 
effects are present when the value of a good for a consumer 
depends on the patterns of adoption by other consumers. 
Network effects can be global – when they depend on the 
patterns of adoption in the whole population – or local – when, 
for a given consumer, they depend only on the patters of 
adoption in that consumer’s social network.
A classic example of network effects is the telephone. The 
benefits attached to acquiring a phone depend directly on the 
number of other people one can call. For example, if nobody 
else owns a phone in one’s community, then one could not call 
anybody even if one had a phone. Thus, buying a phone has no 
benefit. Another example is language: the benefits of learning 
a language are intrinsically linked to the number of people in 
one’s network one can speak it with.
Again, the social network of interactions will have far- 
-reaching implications on the patterns of economic behavior 
in the presence of network effects. Suppose for example that 
individuals decide to adopt a given good (e.g. a telephone) 
only if at least q of their peers adopt the good. Since this rule 
holds for all individuals, adoption can only take place in the 
population if it contains a group of individuals who have at 
least q links with other individuals in the group(4).
A firm wishing to boost the adoption of a good exhibiting 
network effects would thus have an incentive to foster the 
early adoption by enough consumers for adoption to spread in 
the network. A typical example of this phenomenon would be 
Dropbox. Dropbox is a file hosting service that enables, among 
other things, the storing and sharing of documents online. 
To make use of these externalities, Dropbox offers implicit 
discounts (e.g. free storage space) to consumers who invite 
their friends or peers to open a Dropbox account.
3. SOCIAL NETWORKS, ADVERTISING AND PRICING
In the classical product market framework, firms choose 
prices, advertising strategy and quality taking heterogeneous 
consumer preferences as given (Tirole, 1994). A key underlying 
assumption of this framework is that individuals are anonymous 
and make decisions in isolation of each other. As discussed 
above, the role of peers in shaping consumer choice has 
however been shown to be important in many settings. In the 
past, the practical use of such social influences for advertising 
or pricing was limited due to the absence of good data on 
networks. The availability of large amounts of data on online 
social networking along with the other advances in information 
technology have led to an exciting new research program on 
ways that economic actors can harness the power of social 
networks to promote their goals. Practical interest has centred 
on questions such as: what are the relevant aspects of networks 
for marketing and competition? How much should a firm be 
willing to pay to acquire information about social networks?
Galeotti and Goyal (2009) propose a model of large directed 
networks to address these questions. In particular, they study 
a monopoly’s advertising strategy when consumers interact 
on a network. Social interactions among consumers have two 
dimensions: level and content. The level of interaction refers 
simply to the number of people an agent talks to: changes in 
the degree distributions can be studied using standard concepts 
e.g. stochastic dominance(5). The content of interaction captures 
the two main mechanisms presented above through which 
networks may affect individual incentives: social learning and 
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conformity pressures. In particular, in case of word of mouth 
communication about goods’ characteristics, the presence of 
a single informed neighbor leads to product awareness and 
possibly purchase. In other cases (e.g. language learning), 
adoption depends on the number or proportion of agents in 
one’s network who also adopt the good.
Galeotti and Goyal (2009) show that the use of network 
information reduces waste in resources and generates greater 
sales. The effectiveness of social influence campaigns can 
be further increased by using more detailed information — 
such as the connections of different individuals in the social 
network. They also find that that in the word of mouth context, 
it is optimal for the monopoly to target individuals who are 
poorly connected to others. By contrast, in the case of network 
effects where a consumer’s benefits from adopting one good 
depends on the proportion of her neighbours who adopt the 
good, it is optimal to seed the most connected individuals as 
they are otherwise unlikely to adopt the good (as attaining their 
“adoption threshold” necessitates a higher number of players 
who adopt the good than for players with lower degree).
Galeotti and Goyal (2009) finally show that the effects of 
networks on profits depend on the content of the interaction. In 
the word of mouth context, an increase in connectivity enables 
greater spread of information: this increases sales and profits. 
On the other hand, if the product exhibits network externalities, 
an increase in connectivity makes it harder to satisfy players’ 
threshold of neighbors’ adoption. Thus, an increase in social 
interaction in the presence of adoption externalities lowers 
profits.
Galeotti and Goyal (2009) focus on the case with one firm 
and with one step, mechanical diffusion of advertisement. The 
monopoly’s only decision is the level of advertising. Current 
research expands the scope of the analysis significantly to 
include multiple firms, dynamics of spreading information 
(see e.g. Campbell, 2013; Goyal & Kearns, 2012). The use of 
social networks for optimal diffusion of information remains 
a very active field of research in economics.
In a related line of work, researchers have explored the 
use of optimal pricing in social networks. In the industrial 
organization literature consumer value, and hence, pricing is 
conditional on the number of consumers who adopt different 
products (Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). 
Network externality often arises through the use of common 
products or services in personal interaction. So it is reasonable 
to suppose that the value of adopting a product to a consumer 
should depend on how many of her neighbours adopt the same 
product. This observation motivates the new strand of research 
on optimal pricing in networks.
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2016), in a recent paper, explore 
how knowledge of the network may impact firms’ pricing 
behavior. In particular, they model a monopoly choosing a 
pricing scheme for a network good. Consumers interact on a 
network and the utility they derive from the monopoly’s good 
is increasing in the consumption of the players they observe. 
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the extent 
to which they are influential (measured by their in-degree, 
or numbers of agents who observe them) and susceptible 
(measured by their out-degree, or number of agents whom 
they observe). Agents only know they in- and out-degree(6).
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2016) then study how variations 
in the monopoly’s knowledge of the network structure affect 
its optimal pricing scheme. They show that at equilibrium, 
the price that the monopoly sets for each consumer can be 
decomposed in three elements: (i) the optimal price without 
network information, common to all players; (ii) a price 
premium that increases with a consumer’s susceptibility; and 
(iii) a price discount that increases with a consumer’s influence 
on others. The intuition is that the monopoly is willing to 
“subsidize” influential players to boost network effects and, 
thus, adoption of the good. Conversely, highly susceptible 
consumers are “prisoners” of their susceptibility, and the 
monopoly can extract larger surplus from such consumers. 
They also show that the price discounts and premium increase 
in the average level of network effects and their variance: hence 
knowledge of the network is particularly valuable in networks 
with high and dispersed network effects.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The literature on social networks in product markets is 
motivated by practical concerns. The models incorporate 
asymmetric/incomplete information and network externalities. 
The analysis brings out the advantages of using networks 
to define optimal targets for advertising and also in shaping 
optimal pricing. The analysis also highlights the ways in which 
networks can amplify small differences in resources between 
competing players. It is clear that consumer search and their 
word of mouth communication interacts with firm advertising; 
it would be important to develop a common framework that 
incorporates all three elements.
(1) A large and growing industry now specializes in the 
analysis and packaging of information obtained from 
online social networks like Facebook, Instagram, 
and Twitter. These services are largely viewed 
as having profound effects on the decisions of 
firms across industries: “Social media promises 
to accelerate innovation, drive cost savings and 
strengthen brands through mass collaboration. 
Companies across every industry are using it to hype 
new products and services, and also monitor what 
people are saying about their brand” (Schramm, 
2015).
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(2) See e.g. Galeotti and Goyal (2010).
(3) For a formalization of this argument see Bala and 
Goyal (1998).
(4) This maximal such group in any network is defined 
as the “q-core” of a network (see Bollobás, 1984; 
Gagnon & Goyal, 2015).
(5) Empirical work has produced data on degree 
distributions across product categories and has 
studied their relation to individual and demographic 
characteristics. See e.g. Keller, Fay, and Berry (2007) 
and Leskovec, Adamic, and Huberman (2007).
(6) Other related work includes Bloch and Querou 
(2013) and Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar 
(2012). A major difference between these papers 
and Fainmesser and Galeotti’s model (2016) is that 
the former assume that agents have full knowledge 
of the network (instead of only in- and out-degree 
distributions).
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